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CRITERIA FOR SELECTING JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS 
ABSTRACT 
Selecting partners with compatible skilla is not necessarily synonymous 
with selecting compatible partners. This paper identifies and discusses 
several criteria executives aay eaploy when evaluating the suitability of 
prospective partners, including complementarity of technical skills and 
resources; mutual need; financial capability; relative size; complementarity 
of strategies and operating policies; communication barriers; compatibility of 
manage•ent teams; and trust and commitment betNeen partners. 
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS 
A small technology company, let's call it Alpha Corporation, developed 
an advanced design for a computer peripheral. Lacking the manufacturing and 
•arketing acumen, as well as the financial muscle, necessary to rapidly 
comaercialize this breakthrough, Alpha's aanagers decided to seek assistance 
via a joint venture (JV). They approached several fir•s and, after spending 
much tiae analyzing the technical compatibility between their own and 
prospective partners' companies, agreed to venture with one of the industry's 
dominant firms. Their decision was announced aaidst great fanfare--press 
releases, a company-wide celebration, champagne. Analysts lauded the decision 
and predicted spectacular results. Alpha's stock nearly doubled in value. 
Another success story from the Silicon Valley, right? Wrong! Within a 
year the venture had been dissolved, Alpha's stock price had tumbled, and the 
executives who helped set up the venture had departed for greener pastures. 
What had happened? According to the survivors of this debacle, the JV 
confronted problems almost from Day One. Because of differences in the 
partners' sizes and management styles, venture teams constantly complained of 
an inability to work together. Managers from Alpha, used to •aking quick 
decisions and then acting upon them, were frustrated by the slow •oving 
bureaucracy of their larger partner. Alpha's designs were repeatedly, and 
their e•ployees thought unnecessarily, subjected to •odifications by the 
partner's researchers. Product introduction was delayed by several •onths 
when the partner unexpectedly transferred several critical personnel to 
another project. Co•plaints to the partner's headquarters frequently appeared 
to be ignored. To make •atters worse, the delays enabled a co•petitor to beat 
thea to the aarket with a si•ilar product. 
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Alpha's managers did not adequately consider the differences between 
selecting a partner with compatible skills and selecting a coapatible partner. 
They wanted to establish a venture which would achieve corporate objectives, 
but this meant different things to the two companies. The Alpha Corporation 
exaaple is especially insightful because a surprising nu•ber of aanagers do 
not probe deeply enough into the issue of coapatibility between their own and 
I 
prospective partners' co•panies. They want very auch to believe that they are 
building a lasting relationship with their partners--but they're not. 
Establishing a lasting JV relationship is a complex process, and the degree of 
co•patibility between partners is only one of the variables influencing that 
process. Yet, although selecting a compatible partner •ay not always result 
in a long-lived and successful joint venture, selection of an incoMpatible 
partner virtually guarantees that the venture's perfor•ance will be 
unsatisfactory. 
Previous studies have devoted most of their attention to activations for 
foraing a JV, as well as aanaging the venture once it has been established. 
In contrast, this paper identifies and discusses several critical criteria 
which executives may employ when evaluating a coapany's suitability as a JV 
partner. The discussion is based primarily on a series of interviews with 
corporate executives regarding the joint venture experiences of their 
co•panies. These executives, al•ost exclusively fro• senior levels of their 
aanage•ent hierarchies, had been intiaately involved in identifying and 
selecting partners for one or •ore JVs. 
CRITERIA FOR SELECTINB PARTNERS 
Defining a set of criteria for selecting the •right• partner would be 
roughly analogous to telling a person how to pick the •right• spouse--
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certainly a difficult, if not an impossible, proposition. Selection of a 
partner who will be compatible in the long term is a complex and 
individualistic endeavor. Each joint venture is unique in its own way, and 
must be approached accordingly. Yet, there do seem to be co••on elements to 
•any JVs. As a result, the experience of other •anagers •ay provide 
guidelines for selecting a JV partner. Several considerations regarding 
selection criteria--including complementarity of technical skill~ and 
resources; mutual need; financial capability; relative size; co•plementarity 
of strategies and operating policies; communication barriers; co•patible 
management teams; and trust and com•itment between partners--are discussed 
below. 
Seek Co•plementary Technical Skills and Resources 
The primary selection criterion is generally a partner's ability to 
provide the technical skills and resources which complement those of your 
company. If prospective partners can not satisfy this criterion, then 
formation of a joint venture should be a questionable proposition, at best. 
Therefore, technical complementarity should be viewed as a mini•um 
qualification for selection of a partner. 
Technical comple•entarity is deter•ined by analyzing the key success 
factors--those few areas strongly influencing co•petitive position and 
perfor•ance--confronting the proposed venture. Once this is done, you •ust 
evaluate your company's current and anticipated future co•petitive position 
relative to these factors. Those areas where deficiencies exist can serve as 
the basis for assessing the technical co•ple•entarity of a partner. However, 
the analysis should identify •ore than •erely a financial deficiency--such 
resources •ay often be accessed via other options which will not entail the 
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extensive managerial involvement of a partner. Although initi~lly a~pealing, 
a JV based solely on a partner's financial contributions is unlikely to foster 
long term compatibility. 
Technical complementarity can assume many forms. A common alliance 
consists of one parent supplying technology and the other furnishing aarketing 
and financial capabilities. For example, an Aaerican •edical equipment 
company wanted to expand sales of its product line in Eurupe. However, 
because of its small size and limited name recognition, the company was 
hesitant about increasing penetration of the Eu~opean •arket on its own. 
Instead, it sought assistance from a JV partner. Strategic analysis of the 
proposed investment suggested that the partner must be a recognized player in 
the medical supplies industry and have sufficient financial and •arketing 
resources. The partner would also need to evidence the technological 
sophistication necessary to demonstrate the techni~al advantages of the 
American firm's products. Companies not satisfy~ng this set of criteria were 
rejected as possible co-venturers. 
Seeking a partner with comple•entary technical skills and resources can 
perait each partner to concentrate resources in those areas where it possesses 
the greatest relative competence, while diversifying into attractive but 
unfamiliar business arenas. Rathe~ than intensifying weaknesses, JVs can thus 
be a •eans of creating strengths. 
"utual D•p•nd•ncya A N•c••••ry Evil 
"any •anagers have viewed dependency upon other organizations as 
undesirable, and have avoided such situations whenever possible. However, in 
identifying suitable JV partner prospects, there should be so•e identifiable 
•utual need, with each partner supplying unique capabilities or resources 
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which are critical to the venture's success. Proper ~atching should result in 
both partners perceiving that they have a vested interest in keeping the 
venture working, rather than resorting to some non-JV form of investment. By 
having one partner strong ~here the other is ~eak, and vice versa, mutual 
respect ~ill be fostered and second-guessing and conflict can be aitigated. 
Prior experience suggests there should be a umiddle level• of dependency 
between partners. If the level of dependency is too small, the JV is unlikely 
to survive difficult times. On the other hand, too •uch dependency may prove 
unstable because of fears of the consequences of loss of a partner. The 
latter case commonly occurs when small firms JV with much larger partners. A 
small firm may feel insecure, since it would not be able to fully exploit a 
market opportunity by itself, or only at a much slo~er rate and at a greater 
risk than in a shared endeavor. The smaller fir• tends to be hungrier, and 
may need revenues from the JV more than a larger partner. In addition, as 
discussed earlier with the Alpha Corporation example, association ~ith a 
prominent partner may influence the smaller concern's stock price. This is 
particularly worrisome if later termination of the venture is attributed to 
unsuccessful commercialization of the smaller fire's technology. While the 
larger firm may emerge relatively unscathed, JV termination aay severely 
disable the saall firm by causing custoaers, eaployees, and Wall Street to 
question the fira's viability. The resulting daaage to its reputation aay 
cause a precipitous decline in its stock value, hara aorale, and li•it the 
available strategic options. 
Painful lessons regarding dependency between partners were experienced 
by aany coapanies which, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, foraed ventures 
with Asian firms as a aeans of rapidly accessing cheap labor or new aarkets. 
Frequently, Aaerican corporations contributed the initial technology and some 
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of the financing, and they trained their partners in the intricacies of 
running the business. Once this was accomplished, several of the ventures 
were dissolved and the partners later used technology obtained fro• the JV as 
a weapon against their former U.S. allies. 
Several options are available for helping insure that JV partners will 
continue to perceive themselves as autually dependent. One aethod of 
reinforcing autual dependence is to establish so•e aeans of •exchanging 
hostages." For instance, it is often possible to insert conditions into a JV 
agreement whereby a unilateral decision to prematurely break up the corporate 
marriage will result in a substantial charge of some sort, 0 ali•onyu payments 
if you will, as well as covenants against engaging in coapeting activities 
within a specified time period. It may also be possible to guarantee cross 
purchases of specified volumes of products or services by the partners. This 
option can help reduce the potentially devastating iapact of a break-up upon a 
more-dependent firm by guaranteeing access to critical raw aaterials or sales 
revenues during the painful readjustment period. By eaploying techniques such 
as these, the threat posed by dependency on a partner can be reduced 
substantially. 
Avoid •Anchors• 
Nhen conteaplating a JV, be sure that your prospective partner can 
generate the level of financial resources necessary for aaintaining the 
venture's efforts. Managers frequently note their avoidance of potential 
•anchors•--partners which are likely to slow venture growth and developaent 
due to an inability or unwillingness to provide their share of the funding. 
As the vice president of a aajor aanufacturing concern reaarked, •Partners 
will alaost always have differences of opinion regarding expansion. A saall 
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company may have fewer financial resource~ available for shouldering its 
portion of an expansion, or have to pay a higher financing rate than does the 
larger partner. This can not only cause operating problems, but •ay also 
result in some bruised egos, which can further intensify the difficulties." 
A partner's inability to fulfill its financial co•mit•ents--whether due 
to small size, financial difficulties in its other operation5 1 or the 
existence of different discount rates and ti•e horizons--can create turmoil 
for the venture and its managers. Particularly in the early stages of a JV, 
when large negative cash flows are more likely to be encountered, the presence 
of an "anchor" can jeopardize an entire project. Commenting on his company's 
experiences, one senior executive commented that, "The joint venture was 
functioning quite smoothly and was meeting or surpassing both coapanies' 
projections until the financial demands exceeded (the other company's) 
capabilities •••• The resulting animosities ultimately caused the venture to 
be dissolved." 
Although it is not always possible to identify potential •anchors," 
several tell-tale signs may suggest the need for further inquiry. As one 
executive suggested, "You have to look at the partner's balance sheet and ask: 
'Is it a financially solid company?' You have to look at their plans for 
groMth and their profit orientation. Is there a difference in the strategic 
i•portance placed on the JV's activities? Is the partner likely to confront 
financial problems in one or •ore divisions? If so, Nhat Mill be the effect 
upon other activities of the partner, especially the JV?• 
A prospective partner's resource constraints can constitute a 
significant hurdle to the establish•ent of a successful JV. HoMever, if 
proper precautions are observed, the presence of a partner Mith •eager 
financial resources need not prevent JV for•ation or a pre•ature buyout or 
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termination. Especially when insufficient financial contributions are not due 
to financial insolvency, it may be possible to reduce noncompliance. For 
example, the agreement may include penalties if either partner atte•pts to 
back out of the relationship or otherwise sidestep its financial obligations. 
The agreeaent might also stipulate that the companies can not engage in 
similar activities for a specified period of ti•e. Further•ore, the agreement 
•ight be structured such that shareholdings or payouts are contingent upon the 
level of each partner ' s contributions, thus mini•izing perceived inequities 
which might result from disparities in financial contributions. The use of 
these and similar mechanisms can reduce the undesirable effects of an "anchor" 
upon JV activities. 
R&lativ& Co•pany Siz•: Th• El•phant and th• Ant Co•pl•x 
Relative company size is often of para•ount concern when evaluating a 
prospective partner. Although exceptions are nu•erous, joint ventures often 
have the best chance of succeeding if both parents are coaparable in 
sophistication and size, preferably large. When a saall coepany decides to JV 
and chooses a similarly-sized partner, the co•panies frequently •agnify each 
other ' s weaknesses. This is less often the case between two large fires, 
which are likely to have siailar values and control syste•s, si•ilar 
tolerances for losses, and sieilar appetites for risk. Crises are less co•eon 
in large fir•s, particularly in regard to short ter• cash flow. Thus, larger 
co•panies typically offer greater astaying power,• being able to co••it a 
greater voluae of resources over a longer tiae horizon. 
Vet, so•etiaes ventures between firas of different sizes see• warranted. 
Size differences aay yield synergies for the partners. A saaller co•pany with 
innovative technology •ay venture with a large corporation which offers the 
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financial and marketing clout neces~ary to commercialize that technology, as 
was the case with the Alpha Corporation example. Similarly, Nike, an 
innovative designer of athletic shoes, teamed up with Nissho Iwai, Japan's 
sixth-largest trading company. And in 1978, Advanced Micro Devices, with S62 
million in sales, formed a venture with Siemens, West Geraany's largest 
electrical company, to produce a line of microcoaputer systems and related 
products. 
When partners evidence significant size discrepancies--dubbed 11 the 
elephant and the ant complex" by one executive--managers aust be aware of the 
problems which may result. One frequently voiced concern is the possible 
domination of one company over the other, as addressed earlier during the 
discussion of mutual need. A related problem is that the different 
operational environments and corporate cultures of the partners aay appear 
incompatible. For instance, the typically bureaucratic environaent of many 
large firms, with a relatively slow decision making apparatus and a voracious 
appetite for information gathering and analysis, sharply contrasts with the 
more entrepreneurial and quick-response orientation characteristic of small 
firas. A small business, accustomed to reacting within short tiae frames, aay 
feel paralyzed by the seemingly glacial pace at which the larger company 
operates. Yet, the small co•pany's prodding and sense of urgency •ay •ake the 
larger partner nervous. The large company aay interpret its saaller partner's 
spartan environment and inforaality as indicative of a fly-by-night, shoe-
string operation that aay not reaain in business for long. Furtheraore, the 
larger fir• aay perceive that aost or all of the risk is being borne by 
itself--educating a sales force and custoaers about a new product's features; 
assuming responsibility for warehousing, distribution, and soaetimes 
production; lending credibility to the product, along with enhancing the 
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prestige and financial status of the smaller firm. In response to its 
partner's impatience, the larger firm may exercise even greater caution in its 
activities, further exacerbating the problem. 
As the above suggests, differences in management style, decision making 
orientation, and perspective on time may effectively result in corporate 
culture shock, frustrating management from each partner and hindering the 
development and maintenance of good rapport. Therefore, a JV between 
companies of widely disparate sizes often necessitates creation of a special 
environment in order to foster successful venture development. For instance, 
it might be possible to reduce the effects of partner size differences by 
giving the JV virtually a free hand in product development or other 
activities, minimizing administrative red tape and per•itting quicker response 
time. This emphasis on autonomy might be particularly appropriate when a 
venture's environment is characterized by rapid change, and slow response 
might be akin to a kiss of death. The willingness of a partner to allow this 
autonomy might be a critical consideration in the partner selection decision. 
Even if managers express a strong desire for working with partners with 
similar "systems" orientations, that need not dictate ventures between same-
size corporations. On the contrary, the relevant •easure often is not 
absolute corporate size, but the relative size of the respective business 
units. Therefore, managers aay seek partners evidencing si•ilar size at the 
business or division level. Another possibility for •ini•izing the effect of 
size differences is for a s•all fir• to try to identify a large fir• which is 
both hungry and has the •arketing, financial, or technical •uscle necessary 
for a successful venture. This aay require greater diligence in identifying 
and contacting partners, however, since these are attributes which tend to be 
found in certain individuals or business units rather than in an organization 
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as a whole. Yet, their presence helps ensure that the larger partner will be 
sufficiently aggressive to maintain respect from customers and competitors, 
and there is a greater likelihood that both partners will have similar 
perceptions of time as a vital component in the venture's success. 
Strat•gic Coapl•••ntarity: A Pr•r•quisit• for Long T•r• Succ••• 
Although partner size is an i•portant criterion for many companies, it 
is commonly asserted that relative size is not as i•portant as complementarity 
among the partners' strategic objectives. Achieving a fit between co~panies' 
objectives for the joint venture is necessary for maintaining long-term 
commitment. From the outset of discussions, each partner must strive to 
clearly understand what the other participants desire from the union. As one 
seasoned veteran commented, "It is remarkable how aany joint ventures are 
consummated where one or both partners do not clearly state their objectives. 
Under these circumstances, venture failure is al•ost inevitable." 
Different objectives in forming a particular JV, including the timing 
and level of returns on their invest•ents, frequently produces conflicts of 
interest between partners. For instance, one executive reflected upon a 
previous JV involving his company and an Asian firm. He noted that the 
venture evidenced a lack of strategic fit between the partners' objectives: 
his co•pany sought rapid •arket access and a high rate of dividend 
repatriation so its stock price would be •axiaized, enhancing an expansion 
strategy based on exchanges of stock. The partner, on the other hand, sought 
transfer of technology and long ter• •arket develop•ent, rather than rapid 
financial returns. As a result of these differences, the JV perforaed poorly 
and was abandoned within a couple of years. The partner was reported to have 
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used the acquired technological expertise to expand its own market position in 
Asia. 
As partners' objectives diverge, there is an increasing risk of 
dissatisfaction and associated problems. This risk aay be heightened when the 
venture's environment is characterized by a high level of uncertainty, since 
changes in a JV's operations are more likely under these circumstances. 
Unexpected events can cause problems because of the difficulty of formulating 
a mutually acceptable response to change. A power game can result, and the 
venture can collapse if the partners cannot reach an agreement on an 
appropriate course of action. 
However, divergence of corporate objectives can lead to a venture's 
downfall even if performance is satisfactory. For example, Dow-Badische was 
formed in 1958 as a 50/50 joint venture between Dow Chemical and BASF of 
Germany, and it achieved good profitability over much of its life. 
Nevertheless, despite $300 million in annual sales, the venture was ultimately 
dissolved. BASF wanted to expand the venture, but Dow was reluctant to 
contribute additional capital since the venture's activities did not seem to 
fit within the firm's strategic focus. The gap between corporate objectives 
prompted BASF to buy out Dow's shares in 1978 and transform the venture into a 
wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary. 
Although deter•ining a prospective partner's objectives is often 
difficult, it is an essential task nevertheless. Failure to do so aay 
significantly increase the prospect of later probleas. The analysis needs to 
address not only the co•pany's current situation and objectives, but also 
scenarios of its likely future position. The rationale for this is that JVs 
frequently encounter changes in their operating environaents, and it is 
essential that companies anticipate how their partner is likely to be affected 
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by, and respond to, these changes. JVs only tend to work as long as each 
partner perceives that it is receiving benefits or is likely to benefit in the 
relatively near future. Because of differences in objectives, what is good 
for one company may be a disaster for the other party. Therefore, a 
compatible partner would ideally be one with similar values "and objectives, in 
both a short and a long term sense. Such a situation will enhance the ability 
of •anagers to interpret one another's estimates, such as sales forecasts, 
development schedules, and cost estimates. This is particularly critical as 
the strategic stakes--the size of investment, potential effect on corporate 
image, or relationship to the organization's core technologies--increase in 
scale. 
Evaluate Compatibility Betwetn Partntrs' Optratin; Polici11 
Another consideration during partner selection is the similarity of 
partners' operating policies. Executives related several instances where 
differences between partners' policies had caused significant problems for 
JVs. For instance, one venture was nearly dissolved because inconsistencies 
between partners ' accounting systems repeatedly produced disagreement 
regarding timing of purchases, allocation of costs, and so forth. Since the 
JV was only marginally profitable, the method of reconciling disagreements 
could deteraine whether or not the venture would appear on the parents' books 
as a profitable operation, an iaportant consideration for the division-level 
aanage•ent teams. Another executive reported that differences in vacation 
policies between his fir• and his European partner created serious 
difficulties for their JV because the latter co•pany shut down virtually all 
operations for a aonth each su•aer, whereas the U.S. fir• allowed e•ployees to 
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schedule their own vacation time. As a result, the venture repeatedly 
encountered difficulties. 
Partners should be clear regarding the types of policies they will be 
co•fortable working with. For example, U.S. and Western European firas are 
typically accustomed to operating with lower debt-to-equity ratios than is the 
case in Japan. Such policies should be addressed thoroughly before the 
venture is formed. Differences in operating approaches often result fro• 
cultural biases, and •anagers may not be conscious of their existence. They 
•ay take for granted that there is a aright" way to do certain things. As one 
Japanese manager stated, "Many American executives atteapt to force their 
Japanese partners to adopt American aethods of operation, in disregard of the 
distribution structure and other financial and •anageaent •ethods which have 
prevailed in Japan for a long time. For this reason, •any JVs in Japan 
ultimately fail." As these examples illustrate, the co•patibility of 
partners' operating policies •ay need to be considered before forming a 
venture. 
81 A•art of Pottntial Coaaunication Barri1r1 
Co•munication is another potential problem area. By nature, JVs tend to 
be fragile agreements, and co••unication proble•s •ake their operation even 
•ore difficult. Such probleas •ay occur as a result of differences between 
national or ethnic cultures, including language, as •ell as differing 
corporate cultures. Cultural differences can i•pede the develop•ent of 
rapport and understanding between partners. You should not overlook the 
i•portance of a partner with adequate English-language capability, or your 
firm's facility with the language of the partner. The si•ple ability to 
coa•unicate with one's counterpart in the partner fir• often •akes a 
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significant difference in a venture's prospects for success, and the absence 
of this ability has caused more than a few disasters. 
Because of cultural or language differences, subtle nuances may be more 
difficult to communicate. This can require greater expenditures of time in 
negotiations, possibly delaying JV formation or major post-formation 
decisions. The use of buzzwords common to ~any industries tends to compound 
language problems. When buzzwords are used, aisunderstandings can arise 
regarding each company ' s role in a JV. Especially in technology-oriented 
fields, commonly used terms may not have the sa•e connotations for each 
partner. For example, specifications for the Boeing 767 jetliner called for 
fuselage panels to have a "mirror finish. u Boeing ' s Japanese partners 
interpreted that specification too literally and engaged in excessive 
polishing efforts. As a result, labor costs for the initial panels were 
excessive, necessitating further discussions to resolve the •isunderstanding. 
Because of risk of misinterpretation, it may be advisable to attempt to 
substitute simple, "Dick-and-Jane"-type terminology for technical jargon 
during negotiations and follow-up discussions. 
The existence of different cultural perspectives iaplies value systems 
that are not necessarily compatible; you cannot assuae that pro•oting 
interests fro• one perspective will necessarily proaote interests from 
another. However, aanagers should avoid the alternative assuaption that 
different value systems will necessarily be incoapatible. Values associated 
with different perspectives aay be siailar, even if only slightly, or they aay 
be irrelevant to each other; it is not coaaon for thea to be in coaplete 
opposition. 
Prior experience suggests that language and culture tend not to be 
insuraountable barriers, particularly for partners fro• industrialized 
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nations, although they can be an important handicap. Therefore, although 
cultural barriers are often considered when evaluating prospective partners, 
and especially when choosing between two otherwise equivalent partner 
prospects, they seldom function as the dominant selection criterion. 
Coapatibll "•nag•••nt T•••• Htlp R1duc1 Probl••• 
It aay be desirable to select a partner whose aanageaent team is 
compatibl~ with one's own. Personal rapport between the principal decision 
~akers is often an important factor in the selection decision, and the 
inability of management to "take to each other" has frequently been cited as 
the basis for rejecting a prospective partner or for ter•inating a venture. 
Close personal relationships, particularly among the senior operating-level 
managers, helps to nurture the level of understanding necessary for a 
successful JV relationship. Managerial compatibility can enhance partners ' 
ability to ach i eve concensus on critical policy decisions and to overcome the 
frequent roadblocks encountered during joint venture for•ation and operation. 
Though building relationships between partners' aanagers takes ti•e--a 
co•modity aany executives perceive to be in short supply when pursuing JV 
formation--it is an invaluable element of most successful ventures. This 
particularly chuacterizes JVs with Japanese firas, for who• establishaent of 
close personal rapport is customarily a requireaent before business 
negotiations can be concluded. 
In •any ways, it may seem unfortunate that JVs are so heavily dependent 
on personal rapport between a few individuals. Because of the inforaal nature 
of these relationships, including extensive utilization of unwritten 
"gentle•en's agree•ents," reliance upon executive rapport aay lead to 
unnecessary disputes and conflicts of interests at a later date. To reduce 
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prospects for such turmoil, an additional consideration Mhen selecting a 
partner may be the likelihood of continuity among the critical personnel 
within a partner's management team. Such continuity can help minimize the 
incidence of misunderstandings between partners. In this regard, several 
aanagers commented that Japanese executives had expressed hesitancy about 
for•ing JVs Mith U.S. companies, because the typically higher levels of 
manageaent turnover in American fir•s hindered establish•ent and aaintenance 
of close relations among partners' managers. 
Trust and Coaai t .. nt 1 Esunti 11 Eh .. nts of Long Tera Rehti onshi p1 
Forming and operating a successful JV •ay not be synonyaous with the 
maintenance of friendly and cordial relations between partners' aanageme~t 
teams. The perceived trustworthiness and coaaitaent of a partner has been a 
pivotal consideration when selecting •any JV partners. Huaan cheaistry is 
essential to development and •aintenance of trust and coa•itaent, and 
interactions between aanagers helps provide the necessary foundation for their 
establishment. These interactions permit partners to better understand the 
people they will be working with, including their values, concerns, and needs, 
thus helping to assuage potential suspicions. One executive, noting the 
i•portance of mutual trust and coaaitaent in the partner selection decision 
and the process for evaluating these traits, likened the process to a •aating 
dance.• He envisioned the prospective partners as cautiously approaching each 
other, trying to •strut their stuff• and create favorable iapressions, 
engaging in an often lengthy ritual of evaluating autual attraction and 
coapatibility before either would coaait itself fully to the JV. Without full 
coaaitaent by both parties, JVs tend to becoae short tera relationships, or 
"flings,• often followed by divorce and parent-less •children.• For this 
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reason, great emphasis is typically placed on selection of partners evidencing 
trustworthiness and commitment to the venture, particularly by executives with 
more extensive JV experience. 
The need for trust and commitment is especially critical if the JV 
involves activities closely related to your firm's technological core. The 
technological core of many firms is the essence of their corporate strategies 
and competitive advantage. A manager may understandably react with some level 
of initial distrust regarding potential partners' actives. It is useful to 
r~call the inherent fragility of joint ventures when choosing partners, since 
today's partners could become tomorrow's competitors. As one CEO noted, 
"You've got to be sure you ' re working with earnest and ethical people who 
aren't trying to undermine your company. Usually, a partner will have access 
to your trade secrets. He might attempt to complete a few projects, learn 
what you do, then exclude you from future deals." 
Exposing your technological core to a partner who is unable to 
adequately protect this knowledge from technological theft or bleed-through 
can threaten your company's coapetitiveness. As a result, an intuitive 
response aay be to seek majority control, if not full ownership, of any 
venture, and then to hover over every decision the child aight aake--
particularly if you do not trust a partner's intentions. Yet, such a response 
is unlikely to promote coapatibility. 
"iny aanagers take the position that, given the likelihood of soae 
aisunderstanding between the partners, the JV agreeaent should address every 
conceivable contingency. In contrast, aanagers experienced in JVs eaphasize 
the building of mutual trust and understanding, which aake the foraal written 
agreeaent aore a symbol of a coaaitaent to cooperate than an actual working 
docuaent. As one C.E.O. coamented, partners generally udon ' t start looking at 
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the specifics of the venture agreement until the relationship starts breaking 
down and you're contemplating getting out." 
Regardless of protections written into the JV agree•ent, no legal 
document is fail-safe. "You can write all sorts of legal contracts and other 
for•al agreements, but the partners must trust each other and be committed to 
the venture in order for it to work,• noted an executive. •A partner may be 
able to muster a virtual battalion of lawyers, making it very expensive for 
you to take a grievance to court, much less to win it." Therefore, you must 
be comfortable that the partner will honor the spirit, not just the letter, of 
the agreement. Often, particularly for ventures involving the Japanese, 
demands to develop extensive formal contracts dealing with every conceivable 
dispute will be viewed as evidence of mistrust. Managers are to be reminded 
that a JV relationship is delicate at best and co•plicated at worst. Without 
fundamental trust and commitment by each party there is little hope for a 
working partnership. 
Although the preceeding discussion presents a rather long list of 
criteria, managers with JV experience •ay be able to add others. Admittedly, 
these suggestions constitute an ideal set of conditions, and there may be few 
situations where each of these will be fully achieved. Nevertheless, the 
above provides a foundation for the identification and evaluation of 
potentially co•patible JV partners. 
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